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sAMUDRA Report has featured many articles about the origins and functioning of the 
Community Fisheries (CFi) 
organizations of Cambodia (see ‘For 
more’ below). This article focuses on 
a recent scoping study, undertaken 
in August 2015, which sought to 
ascertain if the CFi in Cambodia have 
the essential characteristics and 
attributes necessary to be considered 
organizations that are utilizing and 
governing riparian ‘commons’.
What are ‘commons’? To arrive 
at an answer to this question, we will 
need to first have an understanding 
of what constitutes a ‘commons’. The 
first matter in this regard is to do away 
with the connotation of ‘commons’ 
as being some archaic form of tenure 
which was prevalent in Europe 
in medieval times, pertaining to 
agriculture and livestock activities of 
poor peasants which was usurped by 
feudal lords through what came to 
be known as the ‘enclosure movement’ 
to create forms of private property.
The other, more recent, academic 
association of ‘commons’ is with 
the much-quoted article written by 
Garrett Hardin in 1968 titled The 
Tragedy of the Commons. In it, Hardin 
considers the ‘commons’ to be a 
form of tenure where access to the 
resources therein is ‘open to all’ and 
thus inevitably leads to its depletion 
or destruction. 
The historic association of 
commons being merely a form of 
tenure of ancient times, and the 
association of commons as a form of 
tenure which permits access to all, are 
both incorrect. 
So what then do we mean or 
understand today when referring to 
a ‘commons’? Is it about the nature of 
particular things or resources—such 
as fish in the sea, forests, public parks, 
urban residential complexes, the 
telecommunication spectrum, outer 
space, Antarctica, and so forth? Is it 
about the way human governance 
of these resources/realms should be 
organized—for example, by a like-
minded group, a neighbourhood 
community or a committee of 
interested nations?
In our understanding, commons, 
while they are about certain resources 
and ways of governance, are more 
appropriately visualized as the 
intrinsic combination of (i) a resource, 
(ii) a community utilizing it and 
(iii) a set of social rules and 
norms regarding use, misuse and 
management. 
Principles of the Commons
There have been a whole series of 
investigations and a large body of 
analysis regarding the different types 
of commons, which, even today, 
function very successfully in various 
places around the world. The concept 
of ‘commons’ is also making headway 
into new realms such as software 
development, academic publications, 
music and the like.
One name which stands out when 
we refer to modern-day commons is 
that of the late Elinor Ostrom, the only 
woman Nobel Laureate in Economics. 
Ostrom spent a lifetime showing that 
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when it comes to the managing of 
natural resources, there are tenure 
options between State ownership 
and management on the one hand, 
and market-oriented, privatized 
ownership on the other. It was her 
mission to valorize the examples 
around the world where groups of 
people and cogent communities 
organized themselves to effectively 
and efficiently manage common 
resources sustainably.
From the thousands of examples, 
Ostrom developed several organizing 
principles which lie at the heart of 
successful commons (see Box).
Principles of the Commons and 
Community Fisheries
In order to ascertain if Cambodia’s 
CFi qualify as an example of a 
‘modern commons’, we conducted 
both structured interviews using a 
questionnaire, and non-structured 
conversations with representatives 
from thirteen CFi across the country. 
We tried to ascertain from them 
which principles of the commons 
were present in their organization and 
which were absent. This sample was 
not selected on the basis of any 
planned, purposive, stratified 
or scientific random manner. 
Therefore, there is no claim to a priori 
representativeness of the sample. 
On completion of the interviews, 
we requested two key functionaries 
of the Fisheries Administration to 
use their intimate knowledge of the 
history of each of these CFi to assess 
and arrange the thirteen according to 
their overall performance. 
The key criteria they used to make 
this grouping were: 
well-recognized functioning of •	 CFi 
Committees,
active member participation in •	
activities such as conservation, 
use of resources for livelihood 
alternatives, mobilization of savings 
and funds, 
the involvement of women, and •	
good feedback about the •	 CFi from 
the concerned Provincial Fishery 
Officers. 
Among the thirteen organizations, 
only three were considered to be 
well-functioning and three were 
considered to be poorly functioning, 
with the remaining seven lying on the 
spectrum in between. 
Here are our findings:
(a) Boundaries
On the issue of clear demarcation 
of boundaries, we note that all 
thirteen CFis have attended to this 
task; eight of them have put up 
markers and nine have official maps. 
Variations exist with regard to the 
extent of awareness among the 
members about the boundaries. Only 
two claim that all their members 
are aware of the boundaries. It is 
interesting to note that these are 
the two CFi with the smallest area 
(115 and 337 ha) in our sample. 
(b) Rule Making
Nine of the CFi claim that they 
have devised new rules primarily with 
regard to the procedures and norms 
(how to do, how to share the benefits, 
and so on) for activities which will 
have a bearing on the social and 
economic aspects of the members. 
BoX : 
OSTROM’S EIGHT PRINCIPLES FOUND IN WELL-
FUNCTIONING COMMONS
1. Clearly defined group boundaries.
2. rules governing use of common goods matching with local needs and conditions.
3. those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules.
4. rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities.
5. a system is available, developed and carried out by community members, for 
monitoring members’ behaviour.
6. Graduated sanctions are used for rule violators.
7. accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution are made available.
8. responsibility for governing the common resource in nested tiers is built up from the 
lowest level up to the entire interconnected system.
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All of them state that the rules match 
local needs and conditions. This 
rule making is often premised on 
local, customary practices which are 
socially negotiated and may not be 
formalized in any written form. 
(c) Participation in Rule Making
In the current context, these 
internal rules are usually made 
primarily by the CFi Committee, 
sometimes with the participation of 
a few active members. For example, 
rules on dealing with illegal fishing 
would be made with the participation 
of members of the patrolling groups. 
Among the nine CFi which have 
devised new rules, only two say that 
all their members were involved in 
the process. In seven of them it was 
the Committee and a few members 
who were actively involved. 
Making rules is the easier task; 
getting members to follow them is 
more difficult. In four of the nine CFi it 
is claimed that ‘most’ of the members 
follow the new rules as well as the 
existing CFi rules. In three it is said 
that ‘some’ follow the rules. Only two 
of the well-functioning CFi make the 
claim that ‘all’ members follow the 
new rules made.
(d) Respect for Rule Making
The extent to which outsiders 
(non-members) respect the rules is 
a good measure of the respect and 
the standing which a CFi has in the 
larger society. Six of the nine which 
made rules claim that most of 
the outsiders respect these rules. 
Presumably, this relates to rules 
which affect the outsiders too—such 
as boundaries and issues relating 
to illegal fishing. Four of them state 
that only a ‘few’ outsiders respect 
these rules. 
(e) Monitoring Behaviour
In eleven of the CFi, there is a 
system for monitoring the behaviour 
of members. Much of this relates to 
the issue of illegal fishing. It is the 
Committee, along with members of 
the patrolling groups, who are 
involved in the monitoring, control 
and surveillance (MCS) activities. 
In one—the smallest in terms of 
membership (108) and area (115 ha)—
all the members are involved in MCS 
activities.
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(f) Sanctions for Rule Breaking
In all except the three poorly 
functioning CFi, there are well laid 
out, graded sanctions for rule 
breaking. Again, these are rules 
relating primarily to illegal fishing. 
Initially a person who is 
apprehended for illegal fishing is 
given advice about the ill effects of 
what he is doing, and requested not 
to continue such activities. He is made 
to sign an undertaking with the CFi to 
that effect. A second offence attracts 
a fine and possibly confiscation/
destruction of the gear used. The third 
offence is reported with details to the 
provincial Fisheries Administration 
and the local law-enforcing 
authorities who will take their own 
course of action. The fourth offence 
attracts arrest by the police or 
military, on the advice of the Fisheries 
Administration, and the offender has 
to appear before a court. Some 
fisheries officers have been 
conferred the power to issue warrants 
for arrest.
Of the ten CFi that claimed to have 
graded sanctions, only eight state 
that implementation is effective. This 
only implies that action is being taken 
according to the laid out procedures 
and norms. In most cases, this does 
not imply that the problem gets 
solved—particularly with regard to 
illegal fishing.
(g) Systems of Conflict Resolution
That conflict is common and 
perhaps endemic in this dynamic 
land–water ecosystem is 
acknowledged by all the thirteen 
CFi. The fact that illegal activity is 
so pervasive makes the potential for 
conflicts a permanent feature of the 
system. However, conflicts are not 
restricted to issues of illegal fishing 
alone. 
Since members are dealing with 
several other resources in their 
designated area—for example, 
the flooded rice-growing area, the 
flooded forests—differential and 
competing claims over the various 
common-pool resources are inevitable. 
There are also conflicts which arise 
among members on a variety of 
organizational issues. The presence 
of conflict in a commons is, therefore, 
not a matter of surprise. 
We also note that seven of the 
CFi state that conflicts are settled 
quickly and effectively. Speed is of 
the essence in conflict resolution, 
as also negotiations, mediation and 
efforts to arrive at a consensus 
without leaving a victor and the 
vanquished. 
Many of the CFi report that when 
their Committees deal with conflict 
among members, they call for a 
meeting in a common area (the office 
or the pagoda) and hold a dialogue 
in the presence of local village 
leaders, and make efforts to counsel 
the parties concerned, examine the 
consequences of the conflict, while 
also going into the causative roots. 
Illegal fishing by members because 
of their poverty or sudden household 
needs is a case in point. 
(h) Nested System of Coordination
The management of resources in 
the CFi is clearly not merely a local 
issue which can be restricted within 
their boundary. Where CFi 
organizations exist in close proximity, 
the actions/inactions of one clearly 
affect the other though there may 
be a time lag before the ill effects 
(externalities) become evident. 
Co-operation and co-ordination are 
evidently required to minimise this. 
It is interesting to note that 
on this issue of the need for 
co-ordination, there was perfect 
agreement among all the thirteen 
CFi in our study. 
Currently, the co-ordination 
is done by the provincial Fisheries 
Administration. However, this is 
largely and essentially on a one-to-
one basis between a particular CFi 
and the administration. There is little 
co-ordination amongst the various 
CFi organizations although the 
Sub-Decree of Community Fisheries 
allows it. All thirteen CFi in the study 
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agree that far greater co-ordination 
is needed amongst them. 
Not by Principles Alone
Having completed the assessment, 
in overall conclusion we may say 
that in the majority of the CFi (10 out 
of 13) most of the Ostrom principles 
are present. If we consider the three 
CFi that were designated as ‘well-
functioning’, they exhibit positive 
indicators of all the principles, 
whereas the three ‘poorly functioning’ 
ones lack many of the indicators of the 
eight principles. 
Prima facie, given the data 
available, we may conclude that 
the CFi of Cambodia possess the 
basic framework and principles of 
functioning to be considered good 
examples of a created ‘modern 
commons’. However, as Peter 
Linebuagh, one of the important 
historians and current proponents 
of commons initiatives points out: 
“There is no commons without 
commoning”! ‘Commoning’ may be 
considered the participative social 
attribute of activities and enthusiastic 
work/labour on the part of the 
commoners (the members) in making 
the commons really work. This is what 
differentiates a commons from other 
sorts of institutions.
In our sample, we find a fair 
degree of commoning only in the 
three well-functioning CFi. In the 
case of the remaining ten, they 
merely function as officially 
constituted organizations with 
their elected Committees, with the 
members, to varying degrees, 
being involved in some sort of 
patrolling activities to protect their 
designated common areas from 
illegal fishing. 
Consequently, an organization 
which may have all (or most of) the 
principles ascribable to a ‘commons 
institution’ need not necessarily be 
functioning as a ‘lively commons’. 
It can remain as an ‘empty shell 
commons’. For CFi which are largely 
‘empty shell commons’ to become 
‘lively commons’ requires greater 
stimulation of the self-organization 
process among the membership. 
In many, the Committee, and the 
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For more
members, in their turn, keep waiting 
for the Fisheries Administration, 
an NGO or other development 
partners to assist them. There is not 
much initiative on the part of the 
Committee to enthuse the 
membership to take forward any 
meaningful, collective and beneficial 
actions using the natural resources 
which are available to them in their 
designated areas. In most cases, 
the members are satisfied with the 
individual freedom which they 
have obtained to fish freely all 
year round using legal small-scale 
fishing gear.
Therefore, providing the legal 
framework and governmental 
support which give a community 
the right to create a commons is 
not adequate to make it ‘lively’. 
The commoners involved must also 
enthusiastically engage in defending 
those rights and translate them 
into actionable agenda points for 
conserving the natural resources 
and utilizing them for enhancing 
their livelihood options. Such 
priorities require astute, energetic 
and accountable leadership; creating 
trust among the commoners; forging 
voluntary collective action to defend 
the commons; and devising creative 
strategies to maximize and fairly 
distribute the material blessings from 
the commons.
Many of the 500-plus CFi in 
Cambodia have risen to become 
sterling examples of well-managed 
commons. We encountered three in 
our small sample. However, these 
are still the exceptions rather than 
the rule. 
Clearly, framework and principles 
alone are not adequate to give ‘life’ 
to an organization. A ‘lively commons’ 
is the result of the community of 
members taking full cognizance of 
their rights and responsibilities and 
participating fully in ‘commoning’. 
On this score, the CFi 
organisations of Cambodia have 
a long, arduous voyage ahead. For 
this, they require technical support 
from the fisheries administration; 
financial support from development 
partners and moral support from 
civil society.                                                
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